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Teacher Layoffs in California: An
Update
By NANCY B. OZSOGOMONYAN*
The number of school districts resorting to layoff statutes to reduce
their certificated staffs' is steadily growing as a result of the continuing
decline in enrollment 2 and increasing economic difficulties. Primarily
as a result of economic uncertainty from the threat of Proposition 13,
3
in 1978 there was a 100% increase over the preceding year in the num-
ber of California districts requesting state-conducted layoff hearings.4
* B.A., 1965, Drew University; J.D., 1977, University of California, Hastings College
of the Law. Member, California State Bar.
I. Certificated employees include, for example, teachers, counselors, librarians, and
administrators. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44001, 44006, 87001, 87006 (West 1978). As of
April 30, 1977, the Education Code was reorganized and renumbered. Cal. Stat. 1976, ch.
1010. As part of the reorganization, provisions governing community college districts were
segregated from those applicable to elementary and secondary school districts. Sections that
previously had applied to both community college districts and kindergarten-to-grade-12
(K-12) districts were codified twice in the reorganized Code. Thus, for example, § 12902
became §§ 44001 (K-12) and 87001 (community colleges). Similarly, § 13447, which gov-
erned layoffs, was made §§ 44955 and 87743.
2. Enrollment statewise in grades K-8 declined 2.3% between 1976 and 1977, as com-
pared to 1.7% in the previous year. High school (grades 9-12) enrollment declined 0.8%
between 1976 and 1977, as compared with an increase of 0.1% between 1975 and 1976. Bu-
REAU OF SCHOOL APPORTIONMENTS AND REPORTS, CALIF. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, ENROLL-
MENT AND STAFF DATA 1 (1978). Between 1977 and 1978 the decline was 3.1% in grades K-
8 and 2.1% in high school. Adult education ADA, sharply curtailed in post-proposition 13
budgets, declined by 39% between 1977 and 1978, compared to .7% in the previous year.
Palo Alto Times, May 5, 1979, citing report issued May 4, 1979, by the State Department of
Education.
3. Proposition 13, passed on June 6, 1978, added art. XIII-A to the Californiar Consti-
tution, which limited real property taxes, with some exceptions, to one percent of the as-
sessed valuation of the property reflected on the 1975-76 tax bill. Because property taxes
had been a major source of revenue for public school districts, and because Proposition 13
provided no mechanism for replacing lost revenues, districts had no way of estimating the
amount of funding they could expect for 1978-79. Absent remedial legislation, Proposition
13 would have resulted in a loss of $3.691 billion to California public education. ASSEMBLY
REVENUE AND TAXATION COMMITTEE, FACTS ABOUT PROPOSITION 13: THE JARVIS/GANN
INITIATIVE 49 (Pub. No. 659, rev. ed. Feb. 21, 1978). It was not until June 24, 1978, that the
governor signed S.B. 154, which provided some relief from the effects of Proposition 13
through increased state funding. Cal. Stat. 1978, ch. 292, §§ 1, 13.
4. The 249 requests for hearings in 1978 represented a 100% increase over the number
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In a 1976 law review note,5 this author described the difficulties of
using the layoff statutes, difficulties caused in large part by statutory
ambiguities and a lack of adequate judicial interpretation. The note
identified areas needing remedial legislation or judicial interpretation
and suggested possible resolutions. Since 1976, appellate courts have
clarified some of the important issues of teacher layoffs, but other ques-
tions iemain unanswered. This Article will review recent court deci-
sions and analyze issues yet to be resolved. The analysis will be made
in light of proposed 1978 decisions of administrative law judges (here-
inafter at times referred to as ALJs).6 Study of the proposed decisions
shows that, although ALJs agree on most issues, important differences
in interpretation exist in areas in which neither the legislature nor the
courts have yet provided guidance.
Layoffs Motivated by Economic Uncertainty
When economic concerns dictate a reduction in certificated staff, a
district must act under the provisions of Education Code section 44955
(section 87743 for community colleges). The sections authorize layoffs
only when-there has been a decline in average daily attendance (ADA)
or a reduction or discontinuance or a particular kind of service. 7 If one
requested in 1977. Address by Herbert Nobriga, Director of the Office of Administrative
Hearings, Association of California Community College Administrators workshop (Nov. 3,
1978). Layoff procedures are initiated when a district notifies teachers on or before March
15 that their services may not be required for the ensuing school year because of a decline in
the district's average daily attendance or a reduction or discontinuance of a particular kind
of service. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44955, 87743 (West 1978). Employees receiving a March
15 notice have the right to a hearing conducted by an administrative law judge in accord-
ance with the provisions of the California Administrative Procedure Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE
11500-11528. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44949(b)-(c), 87740(b)-(c) (West 1978).
5. Note, Teacher Dismissals Under Section 13447 of the California Education Code, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 1401 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Teacher Dismissals].
6. Although ALJs submit proposed decisions, the final decision is that of the gov-
erning board of the district. A board may reject a proposed decision and render its own
decision after reviewing the record, including the transcript of the hearing. CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 11517 (c) (West Supp. 1978). The board's decision may be appealed to the superior
court by writ of mandate. Id. § 11523. The proposed decisions cited in this Article may
have been rejected by the governing boards and/or appealed to superior courts. In other
cases, districts may have decided not to implement favorable decisions because financial
difficulties were resolved. Attention is given to the proposed decisions because they are
helpful in charting the trends in layoff law.
7. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44955, 87743 (West 1978). General state financial support for
school districts and community college districts is based upon their average daily attendance
(ADA). In general, the ADA of K-12 school districts represents the average number of
pupils actually attending classes on school days, rather than the number listed on enrollment
records. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 46300-46392 (West 1978). Community college ADA is
determined by attendance during two "census weeks" each semester, rather than by actual
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of these conditions exists, the fact that the motivation is economic is
immaterial as long as the layoff decision is not arbitrary or capricious. 8
In Campbell Elementary Teachers Association v. Abbott,9 the court
expressly upheld the right of a school board faced with financial uncer-
tainties to reduce services because of budgetary considerations. The
district's financial posture was uncertain due in part to the failure of a
tax-revenue ballot measure. Although the district hoped to reinstate
some services, it was compelled to make its initial decision and send
preliminary notices of dismissal by March 15.10 The court held that as
long as a decision to reduce or discontinue services is reasonable, the
motivation is not open to challenge. Further, it was held reasonable for
a district faced with economic uncertainties to reduce services in order
"to allow the district maximum flexibility in determining staffing for
the ensuing school year in light of both available resources and
needs." 1
In spring, 1978, many districts initiated layoff procedures as a re-
sponse to financial uncertainties created by the possible passage of
Proposition 13.12 In the ensuing layoff hearings, teachers contended
that reductions in services based solely on anticipated passage of the
proposition were arbitrary and capricious. 13 ALJs rejected these con-
tentions, finding that the financial uncertainties raised by Proposition
13 made the districts' actions reasonable. 14 Moreover, the fact that the
funding of certain programs would not be affected by Proposition 13
daily attendance. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 84500-84572 (West 1978). Sections 44955-
44959 do not apply to the layoff of probationary employees in districts with an average daily
attendance of more than 400,000 (only Los Angeles Unified School District is in this cate-
gory) where a collective bargaining agreement contains provisions for layoff and reassign-
ment of such employees. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44959.5 (West 1978); see Gassman v.
Governing Bd., 18 Cal. 3d 137, 143, 554 P.2d 321, 325, 133 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1976).
8. Campbell Elementary Teachers Ass'n v. Abbott, 76 Cal. App. 3d 796, 808, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 281, 288-89 (1978).
9. 76 Cal. App. 3d 796, 143 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1978).
10. CAL. EDuc. CODE §§ 44949(a), 87740(a) (West 1978); Degener v. Governing Bd.,
67 Cal. App. 3d 689, 698, 136 Cal. Rptr. 801, 806 (1977).
11. 76 Cal. App. 3d at 808, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 288-89.
12. See note 3 supra.
13. See, e.g., Mary Sonderegger, No. L-16440, at 5 (Glendale Unified School Dist.,
July 7, 1978) (Geftakys, ALJ); Lucian G. Bonnafoux, No. L-16535, at 9 (San Dieguito
Union High School Dist., May 10, 1978). In this Article, proposed decisions are cited by the
name of the first respondent listed in the caption of the decision followed in parentheses by
the name of the school district and the name of the AL rendering the decision. Copies of
proposed decisions cited are on file with The Hastings Law Journal.
14. See, e.g., Mary Sonderegger, No. L-16440, at 5 (Glendale Certified School Dist.,
July 7, 1978) (Geftakys, ALT); Lucian G. Bonnafoux, No. L-16535, at 9 (San Dieguito
Union High School Dist., May 10, 1978) (Britt, AL); Earl Alexander, No. N- 11241, at 7
(Menlo Park City School Dist., Apr. 26, 1978) (Judson, ALJ); Mary Kemmerer, No. N-
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did not preclude a district from reducing those programs. 5 The only
standard applicable to reductions in service is one of reasonableness,
and reducing services unaffected by Proposition 13 presumably enabled
the district to make fewer reductions in other areas.'
6
Unfortunately, because preliminary notices of dismissal must be
served on or before March 15,17 districts often must anticipate reduced
services before they know whether the economic situation in the ensu-
ing school year will actually require such reductions. The layoffs moti-
vated by the possible passage of Proposition 1318 are particularly
illustrative of such premature reductions. When districts give layoff
notices, conduct hearings, and send final termination notices, only to
rescind them when the anticipated financial difficulties do not occur,
teachers are understandably upset. For the sake of efficiency and con-
sideration for the teachers, the yet unresolved factors relating to teacher
layoffs must be realistically examined.
11293, at 3, and Memorandum Opinion at 3 (Piner-Olivet Union School Dist., Apr. 24,
1978) (Doyle, ALJ).
15. William Caredio, No. N- 11292, at 4 (Forestville Union School Dist., Apr. 25, 1978)
(Doyle, ALJ).
16. In one case, Proposition 13-related layoffs were found to be arbitrary and capri-
cious for reasons apparently unrelated to the district's economic motivation. R. Pisicotta,
No. L-16413, at 4-5 (South Bay Union High School Dist., May 5, 1978) (Chapman, ALJ).
The district had resolved to reduce or discontinue certain services and had put a number of
employees on notice. The employees to be affected by the decision were identified solely by
their places on the district's seniority list without regard to whether they were performing a
service to be eliminated. The district's failure to consider the credentials and qualifications
of the noticed employees rendered its decision arbitrary and capricious. See notes 136-50 &
accompanying text infra.
17. See note 10 supra. Children's center employees are an exception. They may be
laid off at any time during the school year for lack of district funds or lack of work. In such
cases, employees are not entitled to the notice and hearing provisions of 44949 or 87740.
CAL. EDuC. CODE § 8366 (West 1978); California Teachers Ass'n v. Pasadena Unified
School Dist., 79 Cal. App. 3d 556, 563-64, Cal. Rptr. 100, 103-4 (1978). Persons hired under
contract with an outside agency or for a categorically funded project are entitled to March
15 notice and subsequent hearing unless the reason for their termination is the expiration of
the contract or specially funded project. Hart Fed'n of Teachers v. William S. Hart Union
High School Dist., 73 Cal. App. 3d 211, 215-16, 141 Cal. Rptr. 817, 818-19 (1977). March 15
notices are required by law to give teachers fair warning that they may not be retained.
Karbach v. Board of Educ., 39 Cal. App. 3d 355, 362, 114 Cal. Rptr. 84, 88 (1974). Districts'
decisions must be based on conditions as they are known at that date. See Lewin v. Board
of Trustees, 62 Cal. App. 3d 977, 982, 133 Cal. Rptr. 385, 388 (1976).
18. See note 3 supra. In 1978, the legislature failed to pass two bills to extend the




Issues Related to Layoffs for Decline in Average Daily
Attendance
Computing ADA for the First Six Months of the School Year
A district is permitted each year to lay off a percentage of its em-
ployees corresponding to the decline it has suffered in ADA. The per-
centage is computed by comparing ADA of the first six months of the
current school year with the first six months of either of the two preced-
ing years.' 9 In Campbell Elementary Teachers Association v. Abbott,20
teachers contended that the district should have compared the ADA of
only the sixth month of the years in question, but the court upheld use
of the average of the figures for each of the first six months. 21 The
court did not specify whether a district must use calendar months or
"school months."
A school month is a four-week period used for reporting ADA to
the state and usually varies from calendar months.22 In hearings held
in spring 1978, administrative law judges rejected contentions that the
statute requires the use of calendar months.23 This conclusion seems
sound because section 37201 requires use of "school months" in com-
puting ADA for attendance purposes, and section 44955 does not spec-
ify that calendar months must be used in computing the same ADA for
layoffs.
Although the school year legally begins on July 1,24 the six months
generally used for ADA comparison begin with the commencement of
the fall semester in September.25 ALJs have found the use of summer
school ADA figures inappropriate because summer school may vary
widely from year to year by reason of optional attendance and changes
19. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44955, 87743 (West 1978).
20. 76 Cal. App. 3d 796, 143 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1978).
21. Id. at 809-10, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
22. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 37201 (West 1978).
23. Martha Hemandez, No. L-16236, at 3-4 (Goleta Union School Dist., May 5, 1978)
(Chapman, ALJ); Jeriarme P. Alberti, No. L-16557, at 6 (Santa Barbara High School Dist.,
May 5, 1978) (Nelson, ALJ).
24. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 37200 (West 1978).
25. At least one superior court has held, however, that, although use of the September-
March period is preferable for computation of ADA statistics, a community college's use of
a July-January period was permissible. Compton College Fed'n of Teachers v. Compton
Community College Dist., Civ. No. 243628 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, Oct. 27, 1978)
(minute order). A law enacted in September, 1978, deletes references to community college
summer school and authorizes districts to maintain intersessions between semesters or
quarters. Act of Sept. 23, 1978, 1978 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv., ch. 1065, at 1536. The new law
does not change characteristics of summer school relevant to the issue of summer school
ADA in layoff cases.
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in curricular offerings. 26
ADA accounting presents special problems for community col-
leges. Colleges compute attendance on the basis of weekly student con-
tact hours during two "census weeks" per semester, rather than on
actual daily or monthly attendance.2 7 The first six months of the col-
lege year may extend into the second semester but end before the first
spring semester census is taken. Thus, use of the "first six months"
comparison standard becomes impossible in that no way exists to relia-
bly account for ADA during the short period between the beginning of
the second semester and the end of the sixth month.
The only reasonable way to compare community college ADA for
two different years is to use only the first-semester ADA. Until the
legislature amends section 87743 to permit community colleges to use
semesters as a comparison period, however, districts probably will pre-
fer to base their layoffs on reduction or elimination of services.
Accounting for Attrition in ADA Cases
In Burgess v. Board of Educaion,2 8 the court held that a school
district must consider attrition when determining the number of em-
ployees to be laid off because of a decline in ADA. The court did not
reach the question of what evidence of attrition, past or future, the dis-
trict must consider.
Two years later Lewin v. Board of Trustees2 9 partially resolved the
issue, holding that in sending March 15 notices, a district must consider
only "positively assured attrition, such as that which has already oc-
curred in the computation period and mandatory retirements." 30 That
26. Edwin Edwards, No. L-16512, at 3 (Compton Community College Dist., May 4,
1978) (Gallagher, ALJ); Maureen Black, No. N-11294, at 3 (Martinez Union School Dist.,
Apr. 28, 1978) (Hanley, ALJ); Tina Bressler, No. N-1 1237, at 2 (Meridian School Dist., Apr.
24, 1978) (Coffman, ALJ). See also Teacher Dismissals, supra note 5, at 1407.
27. Cal. Educ. Code § 84520 (West Supp. 1979). ADA for short courses is computed in
yet a different manner. Id. § 84521 (West Supp. 1979).
28. 41 Cal. App. 3d 571, 116 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1974); see Teacher Dismissals, supra note
5, at 1405. Attrition refers to the number of employees who have left the employment of the
district during a particular period of time.
29. 62 Cal. App. 3d 977, 133 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1976).
30. Id. at 982, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 388. A resignation should not be counted as assured
attrition until accepted by the governing board, see CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44930, 87730
(West 1978), because unless otherwise provided an employee may withdraw the resignation
"if she or he does so (1) before its effective date, (2) before it has been accepted, and (3)
before the appointing power acts in reliance on the resignation." Armistead v. State Person-
nel Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 198, 206, 583 P.2d 744, 748, 149 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1978). See also Leithliter
v. Board of Trustees, 12 Cal. App. 3d 1095, 1098-99, 91 Cal. Rptr. 215, 217-18 (1970); Shade
v. Board of Trustees, 21 Cal. App. 2d 725, 727, 70 P.2d 490, 491 (1937). If, however, the
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is, in determining how many teachers can be laid off due to declining
enrollment, the district must first consider how many teachers will not
be returning due to death, retirement, or resignation. The district need
not account for potential or anticipated attrition. The court recognized
that
[blefore 15 March of each year the board must make its preliminary
determination of the number of permanent employees not to be re-
employed for the following year. Board members are not soothsay-
ers. Voluntary retirements, resignations, and deaths may occur-and
they may not. Certificated employees cannot have it both ways: they
cannot expect to receive early notice of termination and also to limit
that notice by yet unknown later events.
3 '
Assured attrition no longer includes mandatory retirements be-
cause teachers now have the right to continued employment after nor-
mal retirement age, upon certification of competency by the governing
board.3 2 Also excluded from attrition are teachers temporarily absent
on leave.
33
There are at least two other circumstances in which attrition
should not be considered. If no employee is credentialed and compe-
tent to perform the service of a resigned or retired employee, the dis-
trict should not be required to count the latter's departure as attrition.
3 4
In such a case, the "attrition" has not reduced the number of layoffs
made necessary by the decline in ADA. Attrition also should not in-
clude a teacher's resignation or retirement when the resulting vacancy
is filled by an administrator displaced from a newly eliminated admin-
istrative position.3 5
A question not yet fully answered is whether districts must account
for attrition taking place between March 15 and the date when layoff
board had delayed unnecessarily in order to avoid the necessity of counting the resignation
as attrition, the result would be different.
31. 62 Cal. App. 3d at 982, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
32. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 23922 (West 1978); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7508 (West Supp.
1979).
As long as there is a possibility that a teacher may be retained after normal retirement
age, there is no assured attrition. See Donald Hurst, No. N-1 1250, at 6 (Moreland School
Dist., May 4, 1978) (Bobby, ALJ); M. Kelso, No. N- 11249, at 7-8 (Pittsburg Unified School
Dist., May 5, 1978) (Bobby, ALJ); Irene Warringer, No. N- 11244, at 3 (Mill Valley School
Dist., May 3, 1978) (Sarkisian, ALU).
33. Campbell Elementary Teachers Ass'n v. Abbott, 76 Cal. App. 3d 796, 810, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 281, 289-90 (1978).
34. Victoria Toboni, No. N-11152, at 3 (Petaluma City School Dist., May 2, 1978)
(Hanley, ALT); Phyllis Liu, No. N- 11281, at 3 (Bellevue Union School Dist., April 21, 1978)
(Doyle, ALT).
35. See generally Gary W. Gaudet, No. L-16580, at 4 (Bellflower Unified School Dist.,
July 21, 1978) (Willd, ALU).
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decisions become final, usually May 15. Appellate courts have not yet
addressed this issue directly.36 Administrative law judges sometimes
direct districts to reduce the number of layoffs by assured attrition oc-
curring prior to May 15. 37 Apparently, this direction is on the ground
that, because layoffs are limited by statute to the number "made neces-
sary" by the decline in ADA, attrition occurring prior to May 15
reduces the number of necessary layoffs. 38 Because districts cannot in-
crease the number of layoffs to reflect the ADA that has declined after
March 15, however, it is more reasonable to require consideration only
of attrition known to the district on March 15. The statute speaks in
terms of necessary layoffs but does not dictate a date at which the ne-
cessity should be measured. At least two superior court judges have
held that districts need not consider attrition occurring after March
15.
39
Another unanswered question is whether employees laid off in one
year must be counted as attrition, reducing the number of ADA-related
layoffs permitted the next year. Administrative law judges addressing
this question in 1978 were not always in accord, 40 and no appellate
36. In the cases involving ADA-related layoffs decided thus far, the attrition at issue
was that which took place during the computation period and was known to the district on
March 15. See Campbell Elementary Teachers Ass'n v. Abbott, 76 Cal. App. 3d 796, 809-
10, 143 Cal. Rptr. 281, 289-90 (1978); Lewin v. Board of Educ., 62 Cal. App. 3d 977, 982-83,
133 Cal. Rptr. 385, 388 (1976); Burgess v. Board of Trustees, 41 Cal. App. 3d 571, 578-79.
116 Cal. Rptr. 183, 188 (1974). This was also true in Degener v. Governing Bd., 67 Cal.
App. 3d 689, 699, 136 Cal. Rptr. 801, 806 (1977), a case involving layoffs for reduction in
service and not decline in ADA. In the above cases, the courts recognized the inability of
districts to increase the number of layoffs after March 15 and in Degener and Campbell used
this fact to limit the districts' responsibility for considering credentials filed after that date.
The same rationale could apply to consideration of attrition. In another case involving only
reduction-in-service layoffs, the court held that an employee being laid off has the right to be
reassigned to a vacancy that occurred before the termination of her employment. Wellbaum
v. Oakdale Joint Union School Dist., 70 Cal. App. 3d 93, 99, 138 Cal. Rptr. 553, 557 (1977).
The court does not even mention the term "attrition," and, in fact, the district had decided to
fill the vacancy caused by the resignation by hiring an applicant from outside. Id. at 96, 138
Cal. Rptr. at 554. The issue was whether the teacher being laid off had reassignment rights
entitling her to the position.
37. See, e.g., Jerianne P. Alberti, No. L-16557, at 9 (Santa Barbara High School Dist.,
May 5, 1978) (Nelson, ALJ); Carol Coleman, No. N-I 1238, at II (Cupertino Union School
Dist., May 4, 1978) (Judson, ALJ).
38. See CAL. ED C. CODE §§ 44955, 87743 (West 1978); Teacher Dismissals, supra note
5, at 1406.
39. Moreland Teachers Ass'n v. Governing Bd., Civ. No. 402319 (Cal. Super. Ct.,
Santa Clara County, Aug. 23, 1978); Moreland Teachers Ass'n v. Governing Bd., Civ. No.
377341 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara County, Dec. 14, 1977).
40. See Sheila DeWoskin, No. L-16518, at 3 (Warner Union School Dist., Apr. 19,
1978) (Willd, ALJ) (reduction of positions in 1977 not considered as natural attrition when
computing layoffs permitted in 1978). But see Gail Loucks, No. N-I 1134, at 3 (Fairfax
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
court has considered the matter. In establishing the present rule-that
attrition must be considered so that layoffs will not exceed the number
made necessary by decline in ADA--courts have spoken in terms of
normal or natural attrition resulting from resignations or retirements. 4'
Additionally, only assured attrition need be considered. 42 Although
prior layoffs may reduce the layoffs made necessary by the next year's
decline in enrollment, the prior layoffs are surely not normal or natural
attrition, nor are they, in a sense, assured, for laid-off teachers have
preferential rights to reemployment.4 3 Moreover, the economic salva-
tion resulting from use of the discretionary power to reduce services
will be canceled if teachers laid off for reduction in services must be
counted as attrition in the following year's ADA calculations. 4 Thus,
School Dist., May 3, 1978) (Elmore, AUd) (teacher laid off in 1977 must be counted as attri-
tion to reduce the number of ADA-related layoffs permitted in 1978). As to the considera-
tion of attrition in reduct-on-in-service cases, see notes 75-88 & accompanying text infra.
41. Lewin v. Board of Trustees, 62 Cal. App. 3d 977, 982, 133 Cal. Rptr. 385, 388
(1976); Burgess v. Board of Educ., 41 Cal. App. 3d 571, 578-79, 116 Cal. Rptr. 183, 188
(1974).
42. Lewin v. Board of Trustees, 62 Cal. App. 3d 977, 982, 133 Cal. Rptr. 385, 388
(1976).
43. CAL. Enuc. CODE §§ 44956, 44957, 87744, 87745 (West 1978).
44. Teacher Dismissals, supra note 5, at 1413 n.90. Whether prior ADA-related layoffs
should be considered is an important question. Assume, for example, that in year one there
were 500 teachers employed and an ADA of 10,000 with no layoffs in year one or the past
year. The next year, year two, ADA declined 10 % to 9,000 because there were no resigna-
tions or retirements. The number of teachers remained at 500. Application of the regularly
used formula and using year one as the base year results in 50 layoffs. See Teacher
Dismissals, supra note 5, at 1404-05. After the year two layoff, there is a ratio of 450 teach-
ers to 9000 ADA, the same ratio as 500 teachers to 10,000 ADA in year one.
Suppose, now, that in year three there is a further 10 % decline in ADA from 9,000 to
8,100. The district may now compare its 8,100 ADA with that of either of the past two years
to determine the number of layoffs.
Using year one as the base year, we see that there has been a 19% decline in ADA
between year one and year three. Taking 19% of 500 teachers employed in year one we
obtain 95, which subtracted from 500 gives the number of teachers to which the district can
reduce its staff: 405. Assuming again for the sake of simplicity that there have been no
resignations or retirements, we consider the fact that attrition resulting from layoffs in year
two has already reduced the staff to 450. Subtracting 405 from 450, we obtain the number of
permissible layoffs: 45. This gives a teacher/student ratio of 405:8 100, which is the same as
the 500:10,000 ratio that existed in year one.
If we use year two as the base year, the result may be startlingly different if attrition
from layoffs in year one must be considered. If we apply the 10% decline between year two
and year three to the 500 teachers employed in year two, we obtain the number 50, which
when subtracted from 500 gives the number to which the staff can be reduced: 450. Since,
however, the layoffs effective at the end of year two already reduced the staff to 450, appar-
ently no further layoffs are permitted despite the fact that there has been an additional 10%
decline in ADA. This result is erroneous since it ignores the fact that the reduction in staff
from 500 to 450 occurred as a result of the ADA decline between year one and year two.
Consideration of attrition caused by the 50 layoffs in year two should not be required in
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both statutory and policy reasons favor not counting such prior layoffs
as attrition.
Issues Related to Reduction or Discontinuance of Particular
Kinds of Services
Definition of a Particular Kind of Service
Prior to 1977, one of the greatest difficulties in using the layoff
statutes was the different interpretations given to Burgess v. Board of
Education45 in determining what was a particular kind of service. In
Burgess, the court interpreted the term "particular kind of service" to
refer only to services that could be completely eliminated. It concluded
that if a service could not be discontinued, it could not be reduced.
46
Given this interpretation, the court was compelled to find that an in-
crease in class size, which was characterized as "teaching in general,"
was not a particular kind of service because teaching could not be to-
tally eliminated.47 The court in Degener clearly rejected the faulty
premise on which Burgess was based by adopting a standard permitting
the reduction of services that could not be totally eliminated, so long as
the service was not reduced below the level required by law.48 Thus,
there is no reason why "teaching in general" may not be reduced if
statutory minimums are maintained. Doing so would permit districts
to identify "classroom teaching" as a particular kind of service that
could be reduced to justify teacher layoffs. 49 High schools and commu-
year three because that attrition does not reduce the number of layoffs made necessary by
the decline in ADA between year two and year three.
An appropriate formula would use 450 as the number of teachers in the base year two,
rather than 500. Applying the 10% decline in ADA to 450 would allow the district to lay off
45 teachers in year three, minus any normal and assured attrition resulting from resignations
or retirements during the computation period.
From the above, a general rule may be derived. The number of certificated employees
in the base year should be adjusted to reflect the number of employees laid off during that
year. The percentage of decline in ADA should then be applied against the adjusted base
year figure. Thus, in the hypothetical, we would take 10% of 450, which is 45. The present
staff could be reduced to 405 (405-45). Any attrition resulting from retirement or resigna-
tions would further decrease the number of layoffs from 45.
45. 41 Cal. App. 3d 571, 116 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1974); see Teacher Dismissals, supra note 5,
at 1410-13.
46. Burgess v. Board of Educ., 41 Cal. App. 3d 571, 579, 116 Cal. Rptr. 183, 188-89
(1974).
47. See id.
48. Degener v. Governing Bd., 67 Cal. App. 3d 689, 695-96, 136 Cal. Rptr. 801, 804
(1977); accord, Campbell Elementary Teachers Ass'n v. Abbott, 76 Cal. App. 3d 796, 811,
143 Cal. Rptr. 281, 291 (1978).
49. Class size is a subject of negotiation under the collective bargaining statutes appli-
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nity colleges, which can readily identify particular course offerings,
have little difficulty in designating services to be reduced. Elementary
schools, however, often have only a few special services in addition to
general classroom teaching. Permitting reductions in "teaching in gen-
eral" would give elementary schools more than token financial flex-
ibility and would bring them to parity with high school and community
college districts.
In 1976, this author argued that Burgess was being improperly ap-
plied to prohibit dismissals as a result of reductions in particular course
offerings.50 In 1977, the appellate court that decided Burgess adopted
the suggested standard and held in Degener v. Governing Board5' that
"'[a]s long as a district does not reduce its offerings in a code mandated
course below the level required by law, that reduction should be con-
sidered a reduction of a particular kind of service . .. ."52 The stan-
dard announced in Degener applies also to services other than the
teaching of particular courses. In Campbell Elementary Teachers Asso-
ciation v. Abbott,53 the following were found to be particular kinds of
services: reading specialists, consultants, nurses, counselors, instrumen-
tal music teachers, master teachers, traveling librarians, learning assis-
tant teachers, psychologists, speech therapists, and Title I specialists.5 4
The court held that "[plarticular services provided by the district in
excess of the minimum mandated by statute are subject to discretionary
reduction under section 13447."
55
Although the courts in both Campbell and Degener distinguished
the Burgess decision, it may be argued that Burgess has been effectively
overruled.
In actual cases, administrative law judges now consistently permit
layoffs based on reductions in mandated and elective courses. There
cable to California teachers. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.2 (West Supp. 1979). In one 1978
layoff hearing, teachers contended that the proposed layoffs should be invalidated because
they might violate provisions of the collective bargaining agreement concerning student-
teacher ratios. The ALJ rejected this contention, stating that the hearing was not the place
for consideration of the bargaining contract. In this case, the alleged contract violation did
not deprive employees of any rights guaranteed by the layoff statutes. Kathleen Allen, No.
L-16514, at 6 (Laguna Beach Unified School Dist., June 16, 1978) (Willd, ALJ). In contrast,
when a violation of the collective bargaining agreement adversely affected statutorily guar-
anteed seniority rights, the layoffs were invalidated. Christine Shimizu, No. L-16507, at 3
(Huntington Beach City School Dist., Apr. 12, 1978) (Maron, ALJ).
50. Teacher Dismissals, supra note 5, at 1411.
51. 67 Cal. App. 3d 689, 136 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1977).
52. Id. at 695, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
53. 76 Cal. App. 3d 796, 143 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1978).
54. Id. at 811, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
55. Id.
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continue to be differences, however, concerning whether reducing the
number of classroom teachers, increasing class size, decreasing the
length of the school day, and reducing or eliminating preparation peri-
ods and study halls constitute the reduction of particular kinds of serv-
ices. At layoff hearings, those representing teachers argue, citing
Burgess, that these subjects relate to "teaching in general" rather than
particular kinds of services, and, therefore, their reduction cannot j us-
tify layoffs. Districts contend that under the Degener and Campbell
decisions any service may be reduced.
The proposed decisions of ALJs in 1978 show a variety of results.
At least two ALJs concluded that a reduction in the number of class-
room teachers involved a particular kind of service.5 6 One case in-
volved a small district that had no services it could reduce other than
classroom teaching.i 7 The ALJ noted that the impact of Burgess has
been lessened by Campbell and Degener and that logic dictates that a
district should be able to reduce its only service so long as teaching
services do not fall below the state-mandated minimum.5 8 In other
cases, ALJs found that a reduction in classroom teachers by reason of
an increase in class size was not a reduction of a particular kind of
service.59 One ALJ held that reducing the number of periods from
seven to six did not involve a particular kind of service, 60 but another
found that reducing the instructional program to the state's minimum
day was a reduction of a particular kind of service. 6' One ALJ held
that elimination of teacher preparation periods would not justify lay-
offs,62 but another found that study halls were a particular kind of
service.
63
An appellate court must face directly the issue of whether Burgess
56. Margaret Capell, No. N-11290, at 2-3 (Dunham School Dist., Apr. 19, 1978) (Han-
ley, ALJ); Mary Kemmerer, No. N- 11293, at 3 (Piner-Olivet Union School Dist., Apr. 24,
1978) (Doyle, ALJ).
57. Margaret Capell, No. N-11290 (Dunham School Dist., Apr. 19, 1978) (Hanley,
ALJ).
58. Id. at 3.
59. Mary Sonderegger, No. L-16440, at 5-6, 11 (Glendale Unified School Dist., July 7,
1978) (Geftakys, ALJ); Eva Garcia, No. L-16268, at 5 (Anaheim City School Dist., May 16,
1978) (Hogan, ALJ).
60. Gerald Johnson, No. L-16743, at 4 (Manhattan Beach City School Dist., May 4,
1978) (Chapman, ALJ).
61. Mary Sonderegger, No. L-16440, at 3, 11 (Glendale Unified School Dist., July 7.
1978) (Geftakys, ALJ).
62. Earl Alexander, No. N- 11241, at 5 (Menlo Park School Dist., Apr. 26, 1978) (Jud-
son, ALJ).
63. Nancy Bechtel, No. L-16547, at 6 (Seal Beach School Dist., May 1, 1978) (Nelson,
AIM).
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has been effectively overruled. Until that occurs, or until a court more
clearly distinguishes particular kinds of services from "teaching in gen-
eral," the confficting interpretations given by administrative law judges
can be expected to continue.
Reductions Below State-Mandated Levels
Services reduced below the level mandated by law are not "partic-
ular kinds of services" under section 44955 or section 87743 of the Edu-
cation Code. 4 When teachers raise this issue, some administrative law
judges seem to place on the district the burden of establishing that the
reductions will not impair the district's ability to meet statutory obliga-
tions.65 For example, in 1978, ALJs found in several cases that districts
had not shown that after implementing layoffs they would be able to
meet the requirements of state-mandated bilingual programs.66 Where
the legality of the reductions in services was not directly challenged,
however, ALJs presumed that the districts would act lawfully in main-
taining services at legally required levels.
67
In some cases, teachers argued that reductions in required health
services and in teaching of the educationally and physically handi-
capped reduced these mandated services below legal levels.68 Although
certain health services and services for the handicapped are mandated,
a district may eliminate the performance of those services by district
employees and contract for them with a public or private agency. 69 If a
64. Campbell Elementary Teachers Ass'n v. Abbott, 76 Cal. App. 3d 796, 811, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 281, 290 (1978); Degener v. Governing Bd., 67 Cal. App. 3d 689, 695, 136 Cal. Rptr.
801, 804 (1977).
65. See, e.g., Steven Eimers, No. L-16586, at 6 (Fountain Valley School Dist., May 10,
1978) (Geftakys, ALJ) William Caredio, No. N- 11292, at 5 (Forestville Union School Dist.,
Apr. 25, 1978) (Doyle, ALJ).
66. See, e.g., Mary Sonderegger, No. L-16440, at 6, 11 (Glendale Unified School Dist.,
July 7, 1978) (Geftakys, ALJ); Nanne E. Abbey, No. L-16513, at 5 (Santa Ana Unified
School Dist., May 25, 1978) (Chapman, ALU).
67. See, e.g., Gary Gaudet, No. L-16580, at 7 (Bellflower Unified School Dist., July 21,
1978) (Willd, AUJ).
68. See, e.g., Linda Nichols, No. N-11331, at 13-4 (Campbell Union School Dist., May
4, 1978) (Hanley, AL); Ruth Nishimura, No. N- 11368, at 3-4 (Redwood City Elementary
School Dist., May 4, 1978) (Doyle, AL); Earl Alexander No. N- 11241, at 5 (Menlo Park
City School Dist., Apr. 26, 1978) (Judson, AL).
69. See Campbell Elementary Teachers Ass'n v. Abbott, 76 Cal. App. 3d 796, 812, 143
Cal. Rptr. 281, 291 (1978); Rutherford v. Board of Trustees, 64 Cal. App. 3d 167, 177, 134
Cal. Rptr. 290, 296 (1976); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 49402, 49444, 49452, 56032 (West 1978)
(authorizing districts to contract for various health services). Federal law also requires
school districts to provide services for handicapped students, 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (1976), but
does not specify that the service must be performed by district employees. Linda Nichols,
No. N-1 1331, at 4 (Campbell Union High School Dist., May 4, 1978) (Hanley, ALU).
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district establishes that the service can be provided on a contract basis
and asserts that the district intends to do so, the layoffs are allowed.
70
Arguments that the contracting agencies will not meet legally required
standards should be rejected as premature. The ALJs are not in a posi-
tion in April to judge whether the new manner of providing services in
the ensuing school year will meet legal requirements.
Specificity with which Particular Court Offerings Must be Identified
A community college district planning layoffs in 1978 identified
the services to be reduced or discontinued by divisions, such as human-
ities, rather than specifying particular departments, such as English, or
particular courses, such as twentieth-century American poetry. 7' The
administrative law judge held that this procedure complies with statu-
tory requirements and perhaps is the only practical method when large-
scale reductions must be achieved.72 On the other hand, another ALJ
held in a case involving a large unified district that a service described
as three full-time-equivalent positions in vocational education was not
identified with sufficient specificity. 73 Although vocational education
does not appear to be a distinguishably less specific term than humani-
ties, it may be that the individuals to be affected were readily identifi-
able from the description in the former but not the latter case. In any
event, districts should attempt to define services as specifically as possi-
ble to enable employees to assess the probability of their nonreten-
tion.74 Identification by department should be sufficient to achieve that
purpose.
Accounting for Attrition in Reduction-in-Service Cases
There was an almost even split of opinion among administrative
law judges in 1978 on whether districts must account for attrition in
cases involving reduction in services. 75 Some ALJs may feel that Dege-
70. See cases cited note 68 supra.
71. J. Barkley, No. N-11277, at 2-3 (State Center Community College Dist., May 3,
1978) (Coffman, ALJ).
72. Id. at 3.
73. In re Non-Rehiring of 62 Certificated Employees, No. N-11162, at 3 (Berkeley Uni-
fied School Dist., May 1, 1978) (Doyle, ALJ).
74. Cf Karbach v. Board of Educ., 39 Cal. App. 3d 355, 362, 114 Cal. Rptr. 84. 88
(1974) (notice should provide the basis on which teacher can assess probability of
reemployment).
75. Cases in which the ALJ held that consideration of attrition was not required in-
clude Carol Terzakis, No, L-16549, at 4 (Encinitas Union School Dist., June 21, 1978)
(Mevis, ALJ); Linda Nichols, No. N- 11331, at 3 (Campbell Union School Dist., May 4,
1978) (Hanley, ALJ); Janet Hunter, No. N-11372, at 4 (Burlingame Elementary School
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ner v. Governing Board76 requires consideration of attrition. In that
case, which involved only reduction in services, the district had consid-
ered assured attrition, but teachers contended that potential attrition
also should have been considered.77 The court in Degener quoted
Lewin v. Board of Trustees 8 for its holding that only assured attrition
and not potential attrition need be considered. Because Lewin involved
layoffs based on a decline in ADA as well as reduction of services, the
decision is not necessarily applicable where there has been only a re-
duction of services. Moreover, the court in Lewin relied on Burgess v.
Board of Education,79 in which the layoffs were based solely on decline
in ADA. In Degener, the court did not directly address the issue of
attrition in reduction-in-service cases because the district had already
accounted for assured attrition. Because the court did not even recog-
nize the possibility that reduction-in-service cases might be distinguish-
able from those in which ADA is a factor, its decision should not be
considered determinative of the issue.
The code authorizes only layoffs made necessary by a decline in
ADA or a determination to reduce or discontinue services. 80 In ADA
cases, attrition occurring during the period in which the ADA decline is
measured must be taken into account to reduce the number of layoffs
otherwise necessary."' This requirement ensures that employee reduc-
tions and losses will not be proportionately greater than pupil losses.
Reductions are thus governed by ADA losses. The number of dismis-
sals made necessary by a reduction in services, however, is governed by
the district's decision as to how many services to reduce and is not tied
to any statistical computation. 82 References in Degener
83 and Lewin84
Dist., May 2, 1978) (Coan, ALJ); Earl Alexander, No. 11241, at 8 (Menlo Park School Dist.,
Apr. 26, 1978) (Judson, ALJ). Cases in which the ALJ required consideration of attrition
include Gary W. Gaudet, No. L-16580, at 4 (Bellflower Unified School Dist., July 21, 1978)
(Willd, ALJ); Anthony Garcia, No. L-16520, at 5 (Bassett Unified School Dist., May 17,
1978) (Nelson, ALT). Ruth Nishimura, No. N-11368, at 4 (Redwood City Elementary
School Dist., May 4, 1978) (Doyle, ALJ).
76. 67 Cal. App. 3d 689, 136 Cal. Rptr. 801 (1977).
77. Id. at 699-700, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
78. 62 Cal. App. 3d 977, 983, 133 Cal. Rptr. 385, 388 (1976).
79. 41 Cal. App. 3d 571, 578-79, 116 Cal. Rptr. 183, 188-89 (1974).
80. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44955, 87743 (West 1978).
81. Burgess v. Board of Educ., 41 Cal. App. 3d 571, 578-79, 116 Cal. Rptr. 183, 188-89
(1974).
82. See Krausen v. Solano County Junior College Dist., 42 Cal. App. 3d 394, 405-06,
116 Cal. Rptr. 833, 840-41 (1974); Teacher Dismissals, supra note 5, at 1414.
83. Degener v. Governing Bd., 67 Cal. App. 3d 689, 699, 136 Cal. Rptr. 801, 806 (1977).
84. Lewin v. Board of Trustees, 62 Cal. App. 3d 977, 982, 133 Cal. Rptr. 385, 388
(1976).
July 1979] TEACHER LAYOFFS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
to attrition occurring during the "computation period" thus have no
application to reduction-in-service layoffs because the number of nec-
essary layoffs is not determined until the time of the decision to reduce
services.8 5 Even if ADA is increasing and additional teachers are
needed in some areas, a district may decide to reduce services. The
only constraint is that the decision not be arbitrary or capricious or
result in the district's inability to comply with minimum statutory
requirements.
86
The only attrition that could even arguably reduce the number of
layoffs made necessary by a reduction in services is that occurring after
the decision to reduce services has been made. Suppose, for example,
that a counseling position is eliminated, and the least senior counselor
can exercise bumping rights over a teacher of English. The English
teacher's layoff, originally made necessary by the district's decision to
reduce counseling services, would not be necessary if, after the counsel-
ing decision was made, another English teacher resigned.8 7 Neverthe-
less, because the district's ability to reduce services ceases on March 15
regardless of any compelling need that might arise thereafter, consider-
ation of attrition occurring after that date should not be required. 88
Issues Related to Seniority
Determining Seniority
Employees whose services are terminated pursuant to section
44955 or section 87743 must be dismissed "in the inverse of the order in
which they were employed,"8 9 with seniority measured from the first
date on which the employee rendered paid service in a probationary
status.90 Issues involving employees' correct seniority dates often arise
in layoff hearings. Questions frequently concern the seniority dates of
85. Linda Nichols, No. N- 11331, at 4 (Campbell Union School Dist., May 4. 1978)
(Hanley, ALJ).
86. Campbell Elementary Teachers Ass'n v. Abbott, 76 Cal. App. 3d 796, 808, 811, 143
Cal. Rptr. 281, 288, 290 (1978).
87. Attrition in positions for which the English teacher was not credentialed, and thus
not competent to fill, would not make the layoff unnecessary.
88. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra. The filling of vacancies occurring after
March 15 would be governed by the statutes which provide preferential rehiring rights for
teachers. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44956-44957, 87744-87745 (West 1978).
89. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44955, 87743 (West 1978).
90. Id. §§ 44845, 87414; see Teacher Dismissals, supra note 5, at 1421. The seniority
date of employees hired before July 1, 1947 is the date on which they accepted employment
in a probationary position (the date they signed their contract) rather than the first date of
paid service under the contract. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44844, 87413 (West 1978). Probation-
ary employees in community colleges are called "contract employees." Id. § 87602.
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teachers hired as temporary who later became permanent employees
and of those who resigned or took leaves of absence but later returned
to service. If a teacher who served at least seventy-five percent of a
school year as a long-term substitute or temporary employee is rehired
the next year in a probationary status, the year of temporary employ-
ment is considered as though it had been probationary, at least for pur-
poses of acquiring tenure.9' In such cases, administrative law judges
consistently determine, at least in K-12 cases, that the year of tempo-
rary employment is to be considered probationary for purposes of sen-
iority as well as tenure.92 The seniority date of a teacher who resigns
and returns is the first date of paid service after reemployment, 93 but
employees on paid or unpaid leave retain their original seniority dates
91. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44918, 44920, 87478, 87481 (West 1978). Section 44918 does
not limit the purposes for which the year of temporary employment may be considered
probationary, but other sections pertaining to K-12 employees and all sections involving
community college teachers apply only to attaining permanent status.
92. See, e.g., Nanne E. Abbey, No. L-16513, at 7 (Santa Ana Unified School Dist., May
25, 1978) (Chapman, ALU); Steven Eimers, No. L-16586, at 6 (Fountain Valley School Dist.,
May 10, 1978) (Geftakys, ALJ); Earl Alexander, No. N-1 1241, at 2 (Menlo Park City School
Dist., Apr. 26, 1978) (Judson, ALT); Christine Shimizu, No. L-16507, at 2-3 (Huntington
Beach City School Dist., Apr. 12, 1978) (Maron, ALJ). A teacher who has served for one
semester as a temporary employee and then is made probationary does not have the right to
retroactive seniority because of not having served at least 75% of the year as a temporary.
Gary W. Gaudet, No. L-16580, at 5 (Bellflower Unified School Dist., July 21, 1978) (Willd,
ALJ). But see CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44914, 87475 (West 1978) (district may count such a
year as one full year of probationary employment for purposes of determining permanent
status).
93. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44848, 87417 (West 1978). An argument can be made that
permanent teachers resigning and returning within 39 months retain their original seniority
date, but the statutes do not clearly confirm that exception. Sections 44848 and 87417 allow
employees to retain their original seniority dates when their services have been interrupted
"in a manner declared by law not to constitute a break in service." Sections 44931 and
87731 direct governing boards to disregard the breaks in service of permanent employees
who resign and are reemployed within 39 months and to restore the rights of permanent
employees except as otherwise provided. Whether or not §§ 44848 and 87417 provide other-
wise with respect to seniority may depend on whether a direction to disregard a break in
service is interpreted as a declaration that the absence did not constitute a break in service.
Unlike, for example, §§ 44957-44958, § 44931 does not actually declare that the absence
does not constitute a break in service. At least one ALJ has held that § 44848, not § 44931,
determines the date of seniority as the first date of paid service after re-employment. Lucian
G. Bonnafoux, No. L-16535, at 7 (San Dieguito Union High School Dist., May 10, 1978)
(Britt, ALJ). When there is any doubt about a teacher's seniority date, the district must
protect itself by sending the employee a March 15 notice. Such notice will prevent applica-
tion of a domino effect invalidating dismissals other than that of the employee in question
should the ALJ disagree with the district's interpretation of §§ 44848 and 44931. See text
accompanying notes 160-66 infra.
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because leaves do not constitute a break in service.
94
Teachers working as coaches often assert seniority dates based on
their first date of paid service as a coach, which may be earlier than the
beginning of classes. When coaching is an extra-duty assignment for
which an additional stipend is paid, it is not considered in determining
seniority. 95 If, however, as a part of a regular assignment a teacher is
required to report early for coaching or other duties, the early reporting
date is the first date of paid service for seniority purposes.9 6 The sen-
iority dates of teachers who have reached sixty-five years of age also
have been an issue in layoff hearings. Although teachers no longer
must retire at age sixty-five,97 the legislature failed to repeal the statute
that makes permanent and probationary classification cease at that
age.98 Administrative law judges consistently have held that teachers
retain seniority rights independent of classification.9 9 Moreover, the at-
torney general has concluded that the statute changing mandatory re-
tirement laws effectively repealed the laws providing for loss of
classification at age sixty-five. 100
If a district has made errors in the relative order of seniority of
employees receiving March 15 notices, the errors generally may be cor-
rected at the layoff hearing.'°0 A failure to notice an employee because
of a mistake in determining the seniority date, however, cannot be rem-
edied after March 15.102 One way to minimize seniority errors is to
94. See Campbell Elementary Teachers Ass'n v Abbott, 76 Cal. App. 3d 796, 810, 143
Cal. Rptr. 281, 289-90 (1978).
95. M. Kelso, No. 11249, at 6 (Pittsburg Unified School Dist., May 5, 1978) (Bobby,
ALJ).
96. James Baughman, No. N-I 1246, at 6 (Campbell Union High School Dist., May 16,
1978) (Kendall, ALJ).
97. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 23922 (West 1978); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7508 (West Supp.
1979). The age 70 minimum retirement age for community college teachers and others serv-
ing under contracts of unlimited tenure or similar arrangements in institutions of higher
education does not become effective until July 1, 1982. Section 7508 exempts persons whose
earlier mandatory retirement is permitted under federal law, and higher education teachers
are exempted by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act amendments of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 631 (1967)).
98. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44906, 87466 (West 1978). In January, 1978, A.B. 2327 was
introduced to remedy that situation, but it died in committee.
99. See, e.g., Roberta Bums, No. N- 11270, at 6 (Saratoga Union School Dist., May 9,
1978) (Coan, ALJ); Donald L. Hurst, No. N-11250, at 6 (Moreland School Dist., May 4,
1978) (Bobby. ALJ).
100. 61 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 424, 429-34 (1978).
101. See, e.g., Nanne E. Abbey, No. L-16513, at 7 (Santa Ana Unified School Dist., May
25, 1978) (Chapman, ALJ); Steven Eimers, No. L-16586, at 8 (Fountain Valley School Dist.,
May 10, 1978) (Geftakys, ALJ).
102. Degener v. Governing Bd., 67 Cal. App. 3d 689, 698, 136 Cal. Rptr. 801, 806 (1977).
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distribute the seniority list before notices are sent out, asking employees
to inform the personnel office of errors. A failure to contest the dis-
trict's determination until after the March 15 deadline might then estop
a teacher from alleging a different seniority date at the hearing.
0 3
Seniority of Employees Sharing the First Date of Paid Service
Although the relative seniority of community college teachers with
the same beginning date of paid service is still determined by lottery, 10
4
legislation known as the Behr Bill changed the procedure for teachers
in grades K- 12.105 In the case of K- 12 teachers with equal seniority, the
governing board now determines the order of termination and reap-
pointment based on the needs of the district and its students.' 06 A 1978
amendment requires boards to provide a written statement of the crite-
ria used in making that determination. 
0 7
Teachers who have received March 15 notices and whose order of
termination was determined pursuant to the Behr Bill have the right to
receive statements of criteria no later than five days prior to the hear-
ing.10 8 After termination, a teacher may request a statement of criteria
used in determining the order of reemployment. 0 9 Because employees
are not terminated until the end of the school year, requests submitted
prior to that time could be considered premature. Once terminated, an
employee has the right to receive a statement of reasons no later than
fifteen days after such request." 0 Permanent employees have reem-
ployment rights for thirty-nine months after layoff (probationary em-
103. See American Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 77 Cal. App. 3d 100, 108-09,
143 Cal. Rptr. 264, 268-69 (1977).
104. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 87414 (West 1978).
105. Cal. Stat. 1977, ch. 433 (codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44844-44846, 44955 (West
1978)).
106. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44955 (West 1978).
107. 1978 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv., ch. 898, at 636 (amending CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44846,
44955). In one case, an ALJ found the following criteria to be reasonable: (1) credentials, (2)
training, (3) experience, (4) quality of performance, and (5) personal characteristics. Janet
Hunter, No. N- 11372, at 3 (Burlingame Elementary School Dist., May 2, 1978) (Coan, ALJ).
Another district had more specific criteria: (1) special credentials, (2) 50 % assignment dur-
ing the past five years in foreign language, music, industrial arts, and other specific fields, (3)
at least two credentials, one of which authorizes teaching in grades K-8, and (4) placement
on seniority list. Carol Coleman, No. N-1 1238, at 8 (Cupertino Union School Dist., May 4,
1978) (Judson, ALI). Placement on the seniority list referred to the former placement by
lottery.
108. 1978 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv., ch. 898, § 2 (amending CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44955).
109. 1978 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv., ch. 898, § 1 (amending CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44846).
110. Id.
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ployees for twenty-four months),"' during which time the needs of the
district and its students could conceivably change. Because the statute
does not permit districts to amend their criteria for reemployment once
they have been formulated, the criteria will have to be general enough
to allow for changing conditions.
According to the legislative counsel, the purpose of abolishing the
lottery was "to enable districts to respond efficiently to declining enroll-
ment by laying off the less essential of the certificated staff hired on the
same date."'"12 In order to accomplish that purpose, the statute had to
be applied to all teachers being laid off after its enactment, regardless
of when they were hired. " 3 Such application was clearly the legislative
intent in that the Behr Bill left intact the provision of section 44846 that
states that the section "shall apply regardless of date of
employment." "1
4
Despite the recognized legislative intent, the retroactivity of the
Behr Bill was an issue in 1978 layoff hearings. Teachers contended that
the new law unconstitutionally deprived them of a vested fundamental
right in having their seniority determined by lottery." 15 Administrative
law judges unanimously and correctly decided that the Behr Bill could
be retroactively applied. 16 Seniority is not an inherent or constitu-
tional right." 7 Seniority itself confers no rights on employees but enti-
tles them to preferential treatment only to the extent that a statute or
collective bargaining agreement so provides. " 8 Seniority rights may be
limited by subsequent legislation. In Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co.,' 19 the United States Supreme Court held that under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, victims of past discrimination could be
awarded retroactive seniority. In answer to the argument that this de-
nied employees vested seniority rights, the Court stated:
Certainly there is no argument that the award of retroactive seniority
Ill. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44956-44957 (West 1978).
112. Opinion of the Legislative Counsel, No. 16315, at 4 (Nov. 29, 1977).
113. Id.
114. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44846 (West 1978).
115. See, e.g., Sheila Krausse, No. L-16585, at 4-5 (Orcutt Union School Dist., May 5,
1978) (Nelson, ALJ); Janet Hunter, No. N-I 1372, at 4 (Burlingame Elementary School Dist.,
May 2, 1978) (Coan, ALJ); Joan Von Kaschnitz, No. N- 11295, at 4 (Moraga School Dist.,
Apr. 27, 1978) (Kendall, ALJ).
116. Id.
117. Colbert v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 206 F.2d 9, 13 (9th Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 931 (1954); Wicks v. Southern Pac. Co., 121 F. Supp. 454, 457 (S.D. Cal.
1954), affid, 231 F.2d 130 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 946 (1956).
118. Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 53 n.21 (1947).
119. 424 U.S. 747, 773-78 (1976).
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to victims of hiring discrimination in any way deprives other employ-
ees of indefeasibly vested rights in employment. This Court has long
held that employee expectations arising from a seniority system
agreement may be modified by statutes furthering a strong public
interest. 
1 20
Whether or not California teachers have a vested right in the de-
termination of seniority by lottery must be decided under state law. 21
The dimensions of property rights are defined by the statutes and rules
that create them.122 To determine whether a right is vested, California
courts have considered the extent to which the right is already pos-
sessed. 123 In the case of the lottery system, no right to its indefinite
continuation was possessed because the legislature expressly reserved
to itself the right to amend or repeal the statute establishing the sys-
tem. 124 Thus, teachers had no vested right in the continuation of the
lottery system, and, in enacting the Behr Bill, the legislature deprived
them of nothing that it had indefeasibly bestowed upon them.
Bumping and Skipping
After determining that a decline in ADA or reduction in services
will necessitate terminating certificated employees, a district must iden-
tify the particular teachers to be affected. This determination is con-
trolled by the statutory directive that governing boards terminate
employees in the inverse order of employment, determining whether
any employee to be terminated is credentialed and competent to per-
form services being rendered by a more junior employee.125 Both pro-
120. Id. at 778.
121. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-45 (1976).
122. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
123. Turner v. Board of Trustees, 16 Cal. 3d 818, 824, 548 P.2d 1115, 1118, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 443, 446 (1976). In Turner, the court held that the legislature may grant, postpone or
deny teachers' vested rights. Id. at 825, 548 P.2d at 1119, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 447. Under
California law no one has a vested right in public employment except as conferred by statute
or valid regulation. Patton v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 13 Cal. App. 3d 536, 540, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 832, 834 (1970). See also Layton v. Merit Sys. Comm'n, 60 Cal. App. 3d 58, 63, 131
Cal. Rptr. 318, 321 (1976).
124. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44851 (West 1978) (originally enacted as § 13269; Cal. Stat.
1959, ch. 2, at 921). Section 44851 provides that all employment under various sections of
the Education Code (including § 44844, which established the lottery system) "shall be
subordinate to the right of the legislature to amend or repeal [said sections] or any provision
of provisions thereof at any time, and nothing herein contained shall be construed to confer
upon any person employed pursuant to the provisions hereof a contract which will be im-
paired by the amendment or repeal of [said sections] or of any provision or provisions
thereof." Section 44851, like other statutes, is a part of a teacher's contract of employment.
See Fry v. Board of Educ., 17 Cal. 2d 753, 760, 112 P.2d 229, 234 (1941).
125. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44955, 87743 (West 1978); Thompson v. Modesto City High
School Dist., 19 Cal. 3d 620, 627-28, 566 P.2d 237, 242, 139 Cal. Rptr. 603, 608 (1977); Lacy
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bationary and permanent employees have such bumping rights.1
2 6
When identifying the employees to be terminated, the focus of at-
tention differs slightly depending on whether the layoffs are a result of
declining ADA or reduction in services. When reducing services, the
district looks first at the persons actually performing those services.
They will be laid off unless their seniority, credentials, and competency
enable them to bump an employee having less seniority. 2 7 When the
layoffs result from a decline in ADA, the district must lay off the least
senior employees, regardless of the service they are rendering, unless
they possess credentials and competencies not also possessed by a more
senior person among those being dismissed.128 In such case, the district
may retain or "skip" such a qualified junior employee. Teachers have
bumping rights; districts have skipping rights. In some cases, employ-
ees with special skills have contended that they should have been re-
tained, but administrative law judges have ruled that skipping is a
district right and not a duty.1
29
Skipping rights are more readily available to secondary schools
and community colleges, where subject-matter credentials are now re-
quired. 130 Elementary schools lack this flexibility because classroom
v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 13 Cal. 3d 469, 473-74, 530 P.2d 1377, 1379, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 3 (1975); Wellbaum v. Oakdale Joint Union High School Dist., 70 Cal. App. 3d 93,
97-98, 138 Cal. Rptr. 553, 555-56 (1977); Krausen v. Solano County Junior College Dist., 42
Cal. App. 3d 394, 402, 116 Cal. Rptr. 833, 838 (1974).
126. See cases cited note 125 supra.
127. See Lacy v. Richmond Unified School Dist., 13 Cal. 3d 469, 472-74, 530 P.2d 1377,
1378-80, 119 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2-4 (1975); Krausen v. Solano County Junior College Dist., 42
Cal. App. 3d 394, 403-04, 116 Cal. Rptr. 833, 839-40 (1974); Teacher Dismissals, supra note
5, at 1421-22. Certificated employees in the regular school program n.ay bump teachers
employed in a categorically funded project or under contract with an outside agency pursu-
ant to Education Code § 44909 or 87470. Teachers hired for those special programs, how-
ever, may not bump teachers in the regular program when such contract has expired or the
categorically funded project has been completed. 55 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 428, 432 (1972).
Teachers in the regular program may not bump children's center permit teachers with less
seniority because the statutory grounds authorizing layoff of the two types of employees are
different. Rutherford v. Board of Trustees, 64 Cal. App. 3d 167, 180, 134 Cal. Rptr. 290, 298
(1976); see note 17 supra.
128. By limiting the bumping rights of senior employees to positions that they are
credentialed and competent to fill, the statutes authorize districts to retain or skip junior
employees possessing credentials or competencies not possessed by more senior employees
being laid off. See 59 Ops. Cal. Att'y Gen. 73, 76 (1976). The procedure is called "skipping"
because the district skips over the names of junior employees as it progresses through the
seniority list to employees having greater seniority.
129. See Kathleen T. McGreevy, No. L-16579, at 2 (Rio Hondo Community College
Dist., Apr. 18, 1978) (Gallagher, ALJ).
130. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44256(a), 87277 (West 1978).
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teachers are often credentialed and competent to teach any grade.13 1
Those most often skipped in elementary schools are special education
teachers, teachers with bilingual certificates or credentials, counselors,
speech therapists, art and music teachers, and administrators.1
32
In some extreme cases, skipping because of special skills may not
be permitted, such as when a skill is very narrowly defined and is not
the actual academic subject in question. In one case, an ALJ refused to
permit a district to retain a physical education teacher because of her
skill in Afro-Asian dancing when more senior physical education
teachers were being laid off. 3 3 Similarly, a bilingual machine-shop in-
structor was not entitled to preference over more senior instructors
lacking bilingual competency because bilingualism was not a require-
ment for the position. 134 When employees have the same beginning
date of paid service, however, a district may establish bilingualism as
one of the criteria for determining which employees best meet the
needs of the district and its students.' 35 Presumably, meeting affirma-
tive action goals could also be one of the criteria for selecting among
persons with equal seniority.
Competency and Credentials
When a district reduces a service, it must determine whether the
employee performing that service is credentialed and competent to per-
form the duties of any less senior employee being retained. 36 A dis-
trict need not take into account credentials applied for but not yet
received, 37 nor is it responsible for knowing about credentials that
have been obtained but not filed with the district or the county office of
131. Id. § 44256(b).
132. See Nanne E. Abbey, No. L-16513, at 4 (Santa Ana Unified School Dist., May 25,
1978) (Chapman, ALT); Richard Dorothy, No. L-16234, at 7 (Redondo Beach City School
Dist., May 5, 1978) (Chapman, ALJ); Carol Coleman, No. N-11238, at 4-6 (Cupertino
Union School Dist., May 4, 1978) (Judson, ALJ); Earl Alexander, No. N-1 1241, at 6 (Menlo
Park School Dist., Apr. 26, 1978) (Judson, ALJ).
133. In re Non-Rehiring of 62 Certificated Employees, No. N-1 1162, at 3 (Berkeley Uni-
fied School Dist., May 1, 1978) (Doyle, AUJ).
134. Jose Sandoval, No. N-1 1332, at 3 (San Jose Community College Dist., May I,
1978) (Judson, AU).
135. Steven Eimers, No. L-16586, at 7 (Fountain Valley School Dist., May 10, 1978)
(Geftakys, ALJ).
136. See authorities cited note 125 supra.
137. Degener v. Governing Bd., 67 Cal. App. 3d 689, 698, 136 Cal. Rptr. 801, 805-06
(1977).
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education. 138 In Campbell Elementary Teachers Association139 and Deg-
ener v. Governing Board,40 courts held that a district is not accountable
for credentials filed after the governing board's decision has become
final.
Although the courts did not determine whether the absence of a
credential is to be considered as of the date of the preliminary notice,
the date of the hearing, or the date the decision becomes final, they
strongly suggested that districts not be held accountable for credentials
filed after the March 15 notice deadline.' 4 ' The reason is that a district
must analyze the credentials of employees who may be subject to layoff
before it sends the March 15 notices and cannot notify additional em-
ployees after March 15.142 Thus, if a teacher arrives at a hearing an-
nouncing for the first time possession of a counseling credential, it is
too late for the district to add another classroom teacher to the layoff
list. As a matter of practice, districts could notify teachers in the fall of
credentials the district has on record and the need for them to file cre-
dentials newly obtained.
Possession of the appropriate credential does not guarantee a
teacher the right to replace a more junior employee. The teacher also
must be competent to perform the service. 43 Incompetency may be
138. 1d; Campbell Elementary Teachers Ass'n v. Abbott, 76 Cal. App. 3d 796, 814-15,
143 Cal. Rptr. 281, 292-93 (1978). Teachers are required by law to register their credentials
with the county board of education. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44330, 44857, 87210, 87426
(West 1978). If a teacher relies on the representation of a school clerk that the credential will
be filed without further effort needed by the teacher, the district may be estopped from
asserting noncompliance with the registration requirements. Mary Sonderegger, No. L-
16440, at 8 (Glendale Unified School Dist., July 7, 1978) (Geftakys, ALJ).
139. 76 Cal. App. 3d 796, 815, 143 Cal. Rptr. 281, 293 (1978).
140. 67 Cal. App. 3d 689, 698, 136 Cal. Rptr. 801, 805-06 (1977).
141. Campbell Elementary Teachers Ass'n v. Abbott, 76 Cal. App. 3d 796, 815, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 281, 293 (1978); Degener v. Governing Bd., 67 Cal. App. 3d 689, 698, 136 Cal. Rptr.
801, 806 (1977).
142. Campbell Elementary Teachers Ass'n v. Abbott, 76 Cal. App. 3d 796, 815, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 281, 293 (1978); Degener v. Governing Bd., 67 Cal. App. 3d 689, 698, 136 Cal. Rptr.
801, 806 (1977).
143. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44955, 87743 (West 1978); Teacher Dismissals, supra note 5,
at 1422. Competency becomes an issue only when the least senior employee performing a
service that is being reduced or discontinued is credentialed to perform a service being ren-
dered by a more junior employee whose position is being retained. Relative competency
among employees performing the service being reduced is not relevant in a layoff hearing.
See Kathleen T. McGreevy, No. L-16579, at 2 (Rio Hondo Community College Dist., Apr.
18, 1978) (Gallagher, ALJ); Mary Sonderegger, No. L-16440, at 9-10, 12 (Glendale Unified
School Dist., July 7, 1978) (Geftakys, ALJ). When a service is reduced, the most junior
person performing the service is generally either laid off or reassigned. If a more senior
employee performing the service is incompetent, the only means of dismissing that employee
is termination for cause. See also King v. Berkeley Unified School Dist., 89 Cal. App. 3d
1016, 1023, 152 Cal. Rptr. 782, 786 (1979). The court in King held that whether an employee
who has been laid off is competent to hold a position to which he claims reemployment
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shown by a lack of teaching experience or recent academic training in
the field.144
Although a district has the initial duty to examine a teacher's aca-
demic and professional experience and make a determination of com-
petency or incompetency, 145 once the district finds the teacher
incompetent, the burden shifts to the teacher to establish compe-
tency. 146 In one case, a high school teacher established competency to
serve in an elementary school by virtue of having had ten years' experi-
ence as an elementary school teacher. 47 In another case, a teacher who
several years earlier had taught physical education established her
competency to teach that subject; she, however, failed to establish com-
petency in other fields in which she was credentialed but had no experi-
ence.' 48 Administrative law judges readily find a failure to establish
competency when employees have had no experience in a particular
field.' 49 Prior experience is not determinative, however, when it is out-
dated or at a different educational level. For example, a teacher who
had twelve years earlier taught math, science, and other subjects in an
integrated seventh and eighth-grade class was not found competent to
rights is a discretionary decision to be made by a school district's responsible officals because
of their special competence.
144. See Krausen v. Solano County Junior College Dist., 42 Cal. App. 3d 394, 404, 116
Cal. Rptr. 833, 839-40 (1974).
145. See note 125 supra.
146. Although an early decision speaks in terms of a district's burden of proving incom-
petency, actually at issue there was the burden of determining incompetency and the duty to
provide a hearing at which the teacher could present evidence to rebut the charge. Davis v.
Gray, 29 Cal. App. 2d 403, 84 P.2d 534 (1938). See also Krausen v. Solano Junior College
Dist., 42 Cal. App. 3d 394, 403-04, 116 Cal. Rptr. 833, 838-39 (burden satisfied by examining
teacher's experience and qualifications and providing him an opportunity to present evi-
dence of competency). Decisions of AIJs are generally phrased in terms of the teacher's
failure to establish competency, not the district's failure to establish incompetency. See, e.g.,
Gary W. Gaudet, No. L-16580, at 5 (Bellflower Unified School Dist., July 21, 1978) (Willd,
ALJ); Martha Hernandez, No. L-16236, at 4 (Goleta Union School Dist., May 5, 1978)
(Chapman, ALT); Sheila Krausse, No. L-16585, at 3 (Orcutt Union School Dist., May 5,
1978) (Nelson, ALJ); Charlotte W. Hunter, No. L-16548, at 3 (Charter Oak Unified School
Dist., May 5, 1978) (Gallagher, ALT).
This result is in accord with an opinion of the attorney general that states, "Where
competency is not demonstrated by a senior employee, a junior employee having the ability
to serve the needs of the program may be retained. . . and the senior employee may be
terminated." 59 OPs. CAL. ATr'y GEN. 73, 76 (1976).
147. Kathleen Allen, No. L-16514, at 8 (Laguna Beach Unified School Dist., June 16,
1978) (Willd, ALl).
148. Gary W. Gaudet, No. L-16580, at 5 (Bellflower Unified School Dist., July 21, 1978)
(Willd, ALl).
149. See, e.g., Joan M. Anderson, No. N-11253, at 4 (Jefferson Elementary School Dist.,
Apr. 24, 1978) (Michaels, ALJ).
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teach those subjects at the community college level. 50
Skipping Administrators
Districts sometimes retain administrators who would otherwise be
laid off because of their lack of seniority.15 1 In such cases, more senior
teachers who have administrative credentials are often found to lack
the competency or experience required for the administrative posi-
tion. 52 Even if credentialed and competent, however, teachers are not
allowed to bump administrators. In 1978, administrative law judges
who addressed the issue held that the assignment of management em-
ployees is the prerogative of the district and that the seniority principles
of the layoff statutes are inapplicable to administrative assignments.
53
Frequently cited in support of this conclusion is Henischke v.
Sink,154 in which the court upheld the right of a school board to select
its own administrative staff and to reassign administrators without the
showing of cause required for a dismissal. The court recognized that
the confidential relationship between a governing board and its admin-
istrators requires complete trust and that lack of trust is not susceptible
to the type of proof required for a termination. 55 Hentschke supports
the conclusion that a teacher with an administrative credential who
might be competent to hold an administrative position cannot compel a
promotion to an administrative position.
One might argue, nevertheless, that an employee who is competent
and credentialed to perform an administrative service could require the
district to retain him as a teacher if the district wishes to retain a more
junior administrator. If such an employee is retained as a classroom
teacher, however, an ALJ might rule that no teachers more senior to
150. Lewis Lindsay Sign, No. N- 11353, at 3 (Siskiyou Joint Community College Dist.,
Apr. 28, 1978) (Michaels, ALJ).
151. See, e.g., Martha Hernandez, No. L-16236, at 4 (Goleta Union School Dist., May 5,
1978) (Chapman, ALJ); Irene Warriner, No. N-I 1244, at 4 (Mill Valley School Dist., May 3,
1978) (Sarkisian, ALJ); Joan Anderson, No. N-11253, at 4 (Jefferson Elementary School
Dist., Apr. 24, 1978) (Michaels, ALJ).
152. See proposed decisions cited note 151 supra.
153. See, e.g., Lucian G. Bonnafoux, No. L-16535, at 8 (San Dieguito Union High
School Dist., May 10, 1978) (Britt, ALJ); Richard Dorothy, No. L-16234, at 7-8 (Redondo
Beach City School Dist., May 5, 1978) (Chapman, ALJ); Eleanor Zamos, No. L-16531, at 3
(Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified School Dist., May 5, 1978) (Gruen, ALJ); Linda Nichols,
No. N-11331, at 5 (Campbell Union School Dist., May 4, 1978) (Hanley, ALJ).
154. 34 Cal. App. 3d 19, 109 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1973). Hentschke is cited, for example, in
Lucian G. Bonnafoux, No. L-16535, at 8 (San Dieguito Union High School Dist., May 10,
1978) (Britt, ALJ); Richard Dorothy, No. L-16234, at 8 (Redondo Beach City School Dist.,
May 5, 1978) (Chapman, ALJ).
155. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 23, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 551.
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the one retained be laid off if they also are credentialed and competent
to perform the retained teacher's service.'
56
If a district must risk invalidating dozens of otherwise proper lay-
offs in order to choose its administrators, the discretion to select admin-
istrative personnel becomes very limited. For this reason, the term
"competency" as applied to administrative employees should be de-
fined by courts to include the concept of acceptability to the governing
board. Alternatively, the statutes could be interpreted to exclude ad-
ministrative positions from the requirement that districts "make assign-
ments and reassignments in such a manner that employees shall be
retained to render any service which their seniority and qualifications
entitle them to render."'
5 7
Inverse Bumping
In one 1978 layoff hearing, employees asserted what the adminis-
trative law judge called "inverse bumping rights," a concept that in-
volved three groups of employees.15 8 The group with the least seniority
consisted of employees who had been skipped because of special cre-
dentials or qualifications. A second group with slightly more seniority
was composed of classroom teachers being laid off because they were
not credentialed and competent to perform the specialized services of
the more junior employees being retained. Finally, an even more se-
nior group was hot subject to layoff and, in addition, had the same
special credentials possessed by the junior employees being skipped.
The teachers being laid off-the second group-contended that the
district was obligated to reassign the senior classroom teachers to the
positions requiring special credentials. Such a decision would allow
the teachers being laid off to exercise bumping rights over the less se-
nior teachers being skipped. The ALJ ruled correctly that section
44955 did not contemplate "inverse bumping rights." 59 A contrary de-
cision would have allowed the employees in question to affect the em-
ployment of employees senior to them, in effect bumping them out of
their classroom positions and compelling their transfer to positions re-
quiring special credentials. The district's obligation to make assign-
ments and reassignments is limited to attempting to place an employee
156. See text accompanying notes 160-66 infra.
157. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44955, 87743 (West 1978).
158. Charlotte W. Hunter, No. L-16548, at 3 (Charter Oak Unified School Dist., May 5,
1978) (Gallagher, ALJ).
159. Id; accord, Anthony Garcia, No. L-16520, at 3 (Bassett Unified School Dist., May
17, 1978) (Nelson, AL).
July 1979]
who would otherwise be terminated in a position being held by an em-
ployee with less seniority.
The Domino Effect
A district may sometimes fail to send a teacher a March 15 notice
because of a miscalculation of seniority 60 or failure to recognize that
the employee is subject to bumping by a more senior teacher.' 6 1 After
March 15, the district loses its power to correct the error, and the teach-
er cannot be dismissed. 62 A single mistake of this type may set off a
domino effect, invalidating the dismissals of some or all of the employ-
ees senior to the one mistakenly retained. 63 This harsh result is said to
be required by the statutory directive that districts terminate employees
in the inverse order of employment, making assignments and reassign-
ments "in such a manner that employees shall be retained to render
any service which their seniority and qualifications entitle them to
render."'' 64 In addition, the domino theory is based on the provision
that "the services of no permanent employee may be terminated...
while any probationary employee, or any other employee with less sen-
iority, is retained to render a service which said permanent employee is
certificated and competent to render."'
65
According to the domino theory, these provisions prohibit districts
from dismissing any teacher who is credentialed and competent to per-
form the service of any less senior teacher being retained, even if that
means reinstating ninety teachers because one more junior was mistak-
enly retained. 66 Application of the domino theory can have devastat-
160. See, e.g., Lucian G. Bonnafoux, No. L-16535, at 7, 10 (San Dieguito Union High
School Dist., May 10, 1978) (Britt, ALJ); J. Barkley, No. N-i 1277, at 4 (State Center Com-
munity College Dist., May 3, 1978) (Coffman, ALJ).
161. See, e.g., Sheila Krausse, No. 78-1 L-16585, at 4 (Orcutt Union School Dist., May
5, 1978) (Nelson, ALJ).
162. Karbach v. Board of Educ., 39 Cal. App. 3d 355, 363, 114 Cal. Rptr. 84, 89 (1974).
163. See cases cited notes 160-61 supra; Teacher Dismissals, supra note 5, at 1418-20.
See also Frank Vincent Adelman, No. L-16581, at 7, 9 (Orange Unified School Dist., May 4,
1978) (Neher, ALJ); In re Non-Rehiring of 62 Certificated Employees, No. N- 11162, at 3
(Berkeley Unified School Dist., May 1, 1978) (Doyle, ALJ).
164. CAL. EDUc. CODE §§ 44955, 87743 (West 1978); Teachers Local 1163 v. Board of
Trustees, Civ. No. 193982 (Cal Super. Ct., San Mateo County, Aug. 22, 1975).
165. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44955 (West 1978). The provision pertaining to community
college employees is the same except that the terms "regular" and "contract" replace "per-
manent" and "probationary." Id. § 87743. See id. § 87602 for definitions of "regular em-
ployee" and "contract employee."
166. See cases cited notes 160-61 & 163 supra. In Teachers Local 1163 v. Board of
Trustees, Civ. No. 193982 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Mateo County, Aug. 22, 1975), the domino
theory was applied when the district sent a junior group of teachers notices for decline in
ADA and sent more senior teachers notices based upon reduction in services. The ADA was
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ing results. Dozens of otherwise valid dismissals may be disallowed
because of a single error by a district. Because the statute obligates
districts to terminate employees in the inverse order of employment,
the real issue is whether the domino effect is the appropriate remedy
when a district fails to do so.
Given the large number of teachers that may be involved, 167 the
complexity of the procedure, and the legal uncertainties involved in
determining seniority, 168 the opportunity for error is enormous. Unless
miscalculated, and some of those sent ADA notices could not be terminated. Termination
cannot be based on any reason not stated in the March 15 notice. Karbach v. Board of
Educ., 39 Cal. App. 3d 355, 363, 114 Cal. Rptr. 84, 89 (1974). In addition, the court in
Teachers Local 1163 held that all who had been sent notices for reduction in services had to
be reinstated because the district had not shown that they were not credentialed and compe-
tent to perform the services of the less-senior teachers who had been ordered reinstated.
This particular problem no longer need arise because an appellate court has authorized the
sending of notices that state both decline in ADA and reduction in services as the cause for
dismissal. Campbell Elementary Teachers Ass'n v. Abbott, 76 Cal. App. 3d 796, 803-04, 143
Cal. Rptr. 281, 286 (1978).
The domino theory is generally applied to reinstate both permanent and probationary
teachers. See, e.g., Sheila Krausse, No. L-16585, at 2, 4 (Orcutt Union School Dist., May 5,
1978) (Nelson, ALU); Christine Shimuzu, No. L-16507, at 1, 3 (Huntington Beach City
School Dist., Apr. 12, 1978) (Marion, ALJ). But see Lucian G. Bonnafoux, No. L-16535, at
9-10 (San Dieguito Union High School Dist., May 10, 1978) (Britt, ALU); text accompanying
notes 180-85 infra. If the record does not show the credentials and qualifications of the less-
senior teacher, the administrative law judge may presume that those more senior could
render the service, Sheila Krausse, No. L-16585, at 4 (Orcutt Union School Dist., May 5,
1978) (Nelson, AL), although some ALJs merely order the district to make that determina-
tion, Lucian G. Bonnafoux, No. L-16535, at I 1 (San Dieguito Union High School Dist.,
May 10, 1978) (Britt, ALU). If the district has correctly determined the order of termination
by seniority, however, the AL makes a specific determination that no employee is being
retained to render a service that any more-senior employee being laid off is certificated and
competent to render. See, e.g., Helen Peterson, No. N-I 1207, at 5 (Sunnyvale School Dist.,
May 1, 1978) (Judson, ALU); Charlotte W. Hunter, No. L-16548, at 3 (Charter Oak Unified
School Dist., May 5, 1978) (Gallagher, ALJ).
167. See, e.g., Larry Clark, No. L-16519, at 11 (Downey Unified School Dist., June 29,
1978) (Geftakys, ALJ) (163 terminations authorized).
168. An example of an uncertain issue concerning seniority is whether a year spent as an
intern counts toward determining seniority when the intern is rehired the next year as a
probationary teacher. Compare James Baughman, No. N-I 1246, at 6 (Campbell Union
High School Dist., May 16, 1978) (Kendall, ALJ) with Lewis Allbee, No. L-16334, at 5
(Barstow Unified School Dist., July 3, 1978) (Hogan, AIU). Interns may not achieve proba-
tionary or permanent status while serving under an intership credential even though the
credential authorizes the same services as a regular credential. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44454,
44466 (West 1978). Although a year of intership may count toward the achievement of
tenure, id. § 44466, the statute is silent with respect to granting retroactive seniority. See
notes 91-92 & accompanying text supra. A policy argument for not according interns retro-
active seniority, which would give them preference in a layoff situation, is that at the time
they were serving their internship, they had not completed the requirements for becoming a
certificated employee. This is not true with respect to temporary teachers who later are
rehired in a probationary position.
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another remedy is mandated by statute, the consequences of a district's
good-faith error in determining seniority should be limited to reinstate-
ment of employees who were actually prejudiced by the mistake.
Suppose, for example, that because of a decline in ADA a district
decided to reduce the number of certificated employees, and forty-five
probationary and permanent teachers were sent March 15 notices. Be-
cause of a miscalculation of his seniority, Mr. Baker was not notified.
He has less seniority than all but two of the forty-five teachers who
were noticed. Because the March 15 deadline passed before the mis-
take was discovered, Mr. Baker cannot be dismissed. The most senior
of the noticed employees competent and credentialed to perform the
service being rendered by Mr. Baker is Mr. Costello. If not for the
district's error in failing to notice Mr. Baker, Mr. Costello could have
been retained. Mr. Costello has thus been prejudiced by the district's
mistake, but the other forty-four noticed employees would have been
dismissed regardless of the error.
Absent any statutory provision compelling a contrary result, the
natural, reasonable, and logical consequence of the district's failure to
notice Mr. Baker would be limited to the reinstatement of Mr. Costello,
the only person prejudiced by the mistake. This result would apply if
an employer in the private sector violated a collective bargaining agree-
ment by retaining employees with less seniority while laying off more
senior employees. Such cases are usually decided by arbitration. In
one case involving the layoff of more than one thousand employees, the
arbitrator specified that "[tlo avoid misunderstanding, it is intended
that if at a base, two stewardesses with minimum seniority were re-
tained beyond the 15th, only the two stewardesses with the most senior-
ity are to be reimbursed though other more senior stewardesses may
have been released."169 Similarly, recovery of damages at common law
for negligence or breach of contract is limited to persons who prove
they have been injured by the allegedly wrongful act.'
70
The use of the domino theory as a remedy for failure to comply to
the letter with seniority requirements would be appropriate if imposed
169. American Airlines, Inc., 27 LABOR ARB. REP. 448, 453 (1956); see Penn Corp., 61
LABOR ARB. REP. 1045 (1973) (denial of seniority rights to be recalled after layoff under a
collective bargaining contract did not result in reinstatement of senior employees when they
would not have been recalled even if a new employee had not been hired).
170. See, e.g., Griffith Co. v. San Diego College for Women, 45 Cal. 2d 501, 516, 289
P.2d 476, 484 (1955); Guntert v. City of Stockton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 131, 153, 126 Cal. Rptr.
690, 703 (1976); Basilio v. Reif, 272 Cal. App. 2d 564, 566, 77 Cal. Rptr. 521, 523 (1969);
Frustuck v. City of Fairfax, 212 Cal. App. 2d 345, 368, 28 Cal. Rptr. 357, 371 (1963); Fields
v. Napa Milling Co., 164 Cal. App. 2d 442, 448, 330 P.2d 459. 462 (1958).
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by statute. When a right is purely statutory, as is seniority in the case
of teacher layoffs, 171 remedies are in fact confined to those provided by
the statute. 172 If none is provided, any appropriate common-law rem-
edy may be used. 173 The statutory requirement that districts terminate
in the inverse order of employment does not compel a remedy that
would result in reinstatement of employees not adversely affected by a
good-faith procedural error. The only provision that could be con-
strued to support the domino theory is that which states that no perma-
nent employee shall be terminated while any employee with less
seniority is retained to render a service that the permanent employee is
certificated and competent to render.174 There is no legislative history
establishing whether this provision was intended to introduce a domino
effect into the layoff process. Because the statute already requires ter-
mination by inverse order of employment, the statement concerning
permanent employees might appear to give those employees a special
remedy. That conclusion is unnecessary.
At the time the provision was introduced, the layoff statute applied
only to permanent employees.175 Therefore, the directive that employ-
ees be terminated in the inverse order of employment was not sufficient
to indicate that districts had to dismiss probationary employees before
implementing the layoff section. For that reason, the additional provi-
sion appears to have been necessary to clarify the layoff procedure and
does not necessarily represent an intent to establish a remedy requiring
application of the domino theory. When the statute was amended to
include the layoff of probationary employees, the provision in question
was retained and changed slightly.' 76 Because there had been no re-
ported cases involving application of the domino theory, however, the
legislature cannot be presumed to have recognized or intended that in-
terpretation. The legislature is not presumed to be aware of statutory
constructions of administrative agencies in the absence of a showing
that such interpretations were brought to the attention of the legisla-
ture. 177 Unlike opinions of the attorney general, proposed decisions of
171. See text accompanying notes 116-18 supra.
172. County of Monterey v. Abbott, 77 Cal. 541, 543, 18 P. 113, 114-15 (1888); Palo
Alto-Menlo Park Yellow Cab Co. v. Santa Clara County Transit Dist., 65 Cal. App. 3d 121,
131, 135 Cal. Rptr. 192, 197 (1976).
173. Roberts & Co. v. Landecker, 9 Cal. 262, 267 (1858); Palo Alto-Menlo Park Yellow
Cab Co. v. Santa Clara County Transit Dist., 65 Cal. App. 3d 121, 131, 135 Cal. Rptr. 192,
197 (1976).
174. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44955, 87743 (West 1978).
175. Cal. Stat. 1935, ch. 690, §§ 21-22, at 1884-85.
176. Cal. Stat. 1945, ch. 204, § 1, at 675.
177. Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Johnson, 54 Cal. App. 2d 297, 303, 129 P.2d 32, 35
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administrative law judges are not published or widely circulated.
When viewed in the light of its statutory history, the layoff provi-
sion in question cannot be said to unambiguously establish the domino
theory as a remedy. Moreover, a literal construction leading to absurd
results should be avoided in favor of one that is practical and reason-
able. 78 This principle of statutory construction has been employed in
the past to avoid the absurd results of literally applying a provision
seemingly requiring districts to lay off at least one permanent employee
in order to dismiss any probationary employees. 79 An interpretation
that limits reinstatement to employees who would not have been laid
off but for the district's good-faith error would not undermine the legis-
lative intent that seniority rather than some other criterion determine
layoff order. In such cases, there is substantial compliance with the
seniority requirements, and no teacher is injured.
Even if the statutory provision is construed to authorize the dom-
ino theory, there is no authority for extending the remedy to probation-
ary employees. One administrative law judge has expressly limited the
domino effect in this manner, holding that the requirement that em-
ployees be terminated in inverse order of employment is directory and
not jurisdictional. 80 Probationary employees thus were held not enti-
tled to the benefits of the domino effect when a mistake in seniority was
not arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith.' Characterization of statu-
tory obligations as directory as opposed to mandatory or jurisdictional
involves a determination of whether the legislature intended failure to
comply with a procedural requirement to invalidate the governmental
action to which the requirement relates.' 82 If not expressed, "the intent
(1942). To date, there have been no reported cases involving the provision in question or the
issue of the domino theory. Thus, a court should find inapplicable the rule of statutory
construction that in reenacting or amending a statute, the legislature is presumed to be
aware of previous judicial constructions of the statute. See, e.g., Estate of McDill v. Martin,
14 Cal. 3d 831, 839, 537 P.2d 874, 878, 122 Cal. Rptr. 754, 758 (1975); Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal.
2d 345, 355, 289 P.2d 450, 456 (1955).
178. Cryor v. State Personnel Bd., 253 Cal. App. 2d 100, 104, 61 Cal. Rptr. 243, 245
(1967).
179. Krausen v. Solano County Junior College Dist., 42 Cal. App. 3d 394, 405, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 833, 840 (1974) (construing former CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13447, now current §§ 44955,
87743 (West Supp. 1979)); see Teacher Dismissals, supra note 5, at 1402 n. 11.
180. Lucian G. Bonnafoux, No. L-16535, at 9-10 (San Dieguito Union High School
Dist., May 10, 1978) (Britt, ALJ).
181. Id. at 10.
182. Morris v. County of Marin, 18 Cal. 3d 901, 908-10, 559 P.2d 606, 610-12, 136 Cal.
Rptr. 251, 255-57 (1977). In this context the term "mandatory" is not used to distinguish
provisions that are permissive from those that are obligatory but applies solely to the remedy
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must be gathered from the terms of the statute construed as a whole,
from the nature and character of the act to be done, and from the con-
sequence which would follow the doing or failure to do the particular
act at the required time."'
183
The application of these criteria does not warrant use of the dom-
ino theory. The purpose of statutes authorizing layoffs is to enable dis-
tricts facing economic difficulties to reduce the number of certificated
employees 184 and to ensure that employees will be given notice of pos-
sible nonretention sufficiently early so they may seek other positions.1
8 5
In the hypothetical domino theory case outlined above, all employees
except one received timely notice and were being laid off for an appro-
priate reason. The district made a good-faith effort and substantially
complied with the requirement that seniority and not other factors be
used to determine layoff order. Imposition of the domino theory un-
dermines the legislative intent to authorize layoffs more than it impairs
the principles of seniority. Reinstatement should be limited to those
employees actually prejudiced by a district's error.
Conclusion
The number of teacher layoffs invalidated because of procedural
or substantive errors by school districts has declined noticeably in the
past two or three years. Appellate courts have clarified some of the
issues, and administrative law judges seem to be addressing some of the
still-unanswered questions with more uniformity than in the past. In
addition, districts and their attorneys have become more familiar with
the procedures and aware of the pitfalls to avoid.
There are, however, still several areas in which the courts or the
legislature should provide clear, workable standards. The legislature
should act to streamline the unnecessarily intricate layoff procedures.
A single preliminary notice could, for example, replace the present re-
quirement of a March 15 notice followed by an accusation. Such a
solution would not adversely affect teachers' rights. Teachers would
then need to ask only once for a hearing instead of filing a request for
appropriate for the violation of a statutory requirement. Id. at 908, 559 P.2d at 610-11, 136
Cal. Rptr. at 255-56.
183. Pulcifer v. County of Alameda, 29 Cal. 2d 258, 262, 175 P.2d 1, 3 (1946) (citation
omitted), quotedin Morris v. County of Marin, 18 Cal. 3d 901, 910, 559 P.2d 606, 610, 136
Cal. Rptr. 251, 256 (1977).
184. See Ferner v. Harris, 45 Cal. App. 3d 363, 369, 119 Cal. Rptr. 385, 388 (1975).
185. Karbach v. Board of Educ., 39 Cal. App. 3d 355, 362, 114 Cal. Rptr. 84, 88 (1974).
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hearing in response to the March 15 letter and a notice of defense in
answer to the accusation.
A more radical streamlining would do away with the March 15
and May 15 deadlines entirely and require layoff notices to be sent not
later than thirty days after the state budget is chaptered. 186 This ap-
proach is a logical response to post-Proposition 13 school-financing re-
alities. Districts now must rely much more heavily on state financing
than in the past, but they do not know by March 15 or even by May 15
the amount of state funding they will receive. Consequently, the
number of layoffs that may be necessary also must await the state
financing decisions.
Substantive law issues also need legislative or judicial attention.
Although specific mandated courses may be reduced as a particular
kind of service, the issue of reducing general classroom teaching has
not been resolved. In secondary schools and community colleges,
where subjects are taught by designated teachers at particular hours,
there is no problem identifying course offerings as particular kinds of
services. On the other hand, elementary school districts cannot easily
identify the amount by which particular subjects are to be reduced be-
cause many subjects are taught by the same teacher in a self-contained
classroom at unspecified times during the day. Elementary districts are
often limited to identifying the service simply as "classroom teaching."
Classroom teaching, like teaching of specific subjects, should be recog-
nized as a particular kind of service that may be reduced to justify lay-
offs. If not, some elementary districts may be unable to reduce the only
service they provide.
Districts also need a clear standard for determining the extent to
which attrition must be considered in calculating the number of per-
missible layoffs. Because districts cannot increase the number of lay-
offs after March 15, they should not be required to reduce the number
of layoffs by attrition occurring after that date. If the district fills posi-
tions made vacant by post-March 15 attrition, teachers laid off will
have preferential rights to reemployment. In reduction-in-service
cases, neither attrition occurring before nor after March 15 should have
to be considered because the number of layoffs made necessary by a
reduction in services is that determined by the governing board, not
one tied to a mathematical formula as in ADA-related layoffs.
186. In 1979, the California School Boards Association announced that it would sponsor
legislation incorporating this approach. PROPOSITION 13 INFORMATION SERVICE, Jan. 12,
1979, at 10-12; Senate Bill 1133 (1979) would extend the deadline for layoff notices to be sent
during the 1979-80 school year.
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Of all the legal questions and problems related to layoffs, the one
most crucially in need of resolution is the application of the domino
theory. Judicial interpretation or perhaps even legislation is needed to
relieve districts of the harsh and absurd consequences of the domino
effect. The remedy of reinstatement must be limited to teachers actu-
ally prejudiced by a district's error.
The number of teacher layoff hearings will rise in the near future
as districts increasingly experience the effects of declining enrollment,
inflation, financial uncertainty, and losses in revenue. Now more than
ever the remaining unanswered questions must be addressed and a
clear, workable, and uniform standard adopted to enable districts to
plan needed staff reductions with assurance that their decisions will be
upheld.

